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Introduction 
 
From an early age, we thought it important to approach our Christian beliefs rationally.  Through 
C. S. Lewis and contemporary Christian apologetics, we encountered various arguments in support 
of the Christian worldview.  Later we discovered the latest and greatest arguments of natural 
theology, many of which we found convincing.  In light of these arguments, we were tempted to 
endorse a Classical Evidentialist approach to religious epistemology: belief in God or Christianity 
is justified if and only if it is supported by good arguments.1  This made sense, for we wanted our 
beliefs to be grounded in solid reasons rather than wishful thinking or tribal prejudice.   
 
As we read more philosophy during our undergraduate years, however, we encountered the 
growing movement of Reformed Epistemology in the writings of Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, and others.  We came to believe that the Classical Evidentialist approach did not 
adequately account for the ability of people without Ph.D.s to hold justified religious beliefs.  
Furthermore, when we assessed the foundations of our own beliefs, we realized that, though we 
possessed arguments, our beliefs did not absolutely depend on those arguments.  Thus, we found 
Reformed Epistemology’s critique of Classical Evidentialism deeply attractive.   
 
Nevertheless, we couldn’t shake the conviction that evidence matters to the justification of our 
beliefs.  Only in our graduate studies did we come to see that a third option—the phenomenal 
conservative approach—offers a more satisfying synthesis of the good-making features found in 
both Classical Evidentialism and Reformed Epistemology.   
 
In this essay, we set forth the basics of phenomenal conservatism (PC) and defend it against 
common objections.  We then use PC to develop an overall approach to the justification of religious 
belief.  Several advantages of this approach emerge which allow it to walk a middle road between 
Classical Evidentialism and Reformed Epistemology.  Most prominently, PC acknowledges that 
experiences can directly provide evidence for belief.  Thus, a religious belief can be justified by 
evidence even if it is not based on arguments.  Given our backgrounds, we will limit our discussion 
to theistic and Christian beliefs.  However, almost everything we say could apply to other forms 
of religious belief as well. 
 
                                                          
1 Classical Evidentialism would also maintain that these arguments must be founded on propositions that are 
incorrigible. 
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Phenomenal Conservatism 
 
A well-formed belief structure is like a sturdy house.  Some bricks may be supported by other 
bricks, but underlying them all is a foundation.  The foundation of the house is supported not by 
other bricks but by the ground, which has the unique ability to support the elements on top of it 
without itself requiring support.  In the same way, some beliefs may be justified by other beliefs, 
but ultimately our belief structures must rest on properly basic beliefs that are non-inferentially 
justified.  These foundational beliefs are not based on other beliefs but on experiences, which have 
the unique ability to justify beliefs without themselves requiring justification.2   
 
If (like most epistemologists in history) we accept this picture, the question becomes:  What kinds 
of experiences are capable of non-inferentially justifying belief?  Philosophers like Descartes and 
Hume said that only introspection and rational intuition could justify basic beliefs.  These sorts of 
experiences, they thought, deserved the benefit of the doubt.  Perceptual experiences, on the other 
hand, had to be proven reliable before they could be trusted.  By the end of the early Modern period 
it was clear that such a view led to skepticism.  Reason and introspection provide too meager of a 
foundation to support the existence of the external world or other matters of common sense.3 
 
To account for the justification of common-sense beliefs, we must extend the benefit of the doubt 
to other kinds of experiences.  Following in the footsteps of the “common sense” tradition of 
epistemology from Carneades (in the second century B.C.) to Thomas Reid (in the eighteenth 
century) to Roderick Chisholm in our own time,4 Michael Huemer has proposed the following 
principle: 
 
(Phenomenal Conservatism):  If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S 
thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p.  (Huemer 2007: 30)5 
 
PC extends the benefit of the doubt to everything that seems true to us.  For example, intuitions, 
introspections, perceptions, and memories are all different types of experiences in which 
something seems true.  PC says that all of these experiences—these “seemings”—are capable of 
justifying basic beliefs.6 
 
It is imperative to see that PC is a principle of non-inferential justification.  If there seems to be a 
tree in front of me, then I immediately have justification for believing this.  I do not need to make 
the second-order observation that I am being appeared to treely, and then infer that there is a tree 
which is making things appear this way.7  It just seems to me that there is a tree, I am moved to 
                                                          
2 This position is called “foundationalism.”  The alternatives to foundationalism are infinitism, which says that 
justification requires an infinite regress of beliefs, and coherentism, which drops the linear conception of justification 
altogether and says that individual beliefs are justified by virtue of their presence in a coherent belief structure.  See 
Klein 1999 and Bonjour 1985 for classic defenses of infinitism and coherentism, respectively. 
3 There are those who disagree.  See Vogel 1990 on the explanationist response to skepticism. 
4 On the history of this tradition see especially Chisholm 1966, Gage 2014b: ch. 4, and (concerning Reid) McAllister 
2016. 
5 This version of PC is slightly (but importantly) revised from Huemer 2001. 
6 For recent defenses of experience as evidence, see Gage 2014b and Gage 2018. 
7 It is good that PC does not require this, for typically one lacks any second-order belief about oneself seeing a tree. 
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believe it, and (assuming I have no defeaters or substantial counter-evidence) this belief is 
justified.8 
 
Beliefs based on seemings can be justified to different degrees depending on the seeming’s 
strength.  Something that seems exceedingly obvious, say, that everything is identical to itself, 
might thereby be justified to a degree sufficient for knowledge, whereas something that only 
slightly seems true might be justified to a much lesser degree.  The important point is this:  
seemings provide positive reasons for belief.9   
 
Seemings can sound technical, but we all have them constantly.  A seeming is simply a conscious 
experience in which a proposition is presented to the subject as true—i.e., a conscious experience 
with assertive propositional content.  We call seemings “assertive” because they feel as though 
they are asserting something to be true of the world.  In contrast, when you merely imagine that 
something is true, it doesn’t feel as though the state of affairs being entertained is representative 
of the way things actually are.  Thus, imagination lacks this assertive quality (Huemer 2001: 77-
79; Tucker 2010: 530). 
 
Chisholm (1957: 44-47) helpfully distinguished the epistemic sense of ‘seeming’ from the 
comparative sense in which something looks the way such things typically look.  A stick in water, 
for instance, might seem bent in the comparative sense without it seeming epistemically that the 
stick is truly bent.  In the epistemic sense of ‘seeming,’ it will not seem to the experienced rower 
that a submerged oar is bent (even if it looks that way in the comparative sense).  Seemings, then, 
are not mere ‘looks’ but rather the way things seem to us to be in reality.   
 
Some (e.g., Swinburne 2001: 135-151; Rogers and Matheson 2011) suggest that seemings are 
reducible to beliefs or inclinations to believe.  But we think this reduction should be resisted.10  
First, seemings provide non-trivial explanations for our beliefs and inclinations to believe (Huemer 
2007).  Seemings explain why we believe or are inclined to believe, and so cannot be identified 
with those beliefs or inclinations.  Second, something can seem true without one believing (or 
feeling inclined to believe) that it’s true, such as when you see a tree in passing but pay it no mind.  
There are also cases where seemings conflict.  Say p seems true to you, but then, on the basis of 
expert testimony, you have a second experience in which p seems false.  You will likely withhold 
judgment for at least a short time until you figure out how to resolve the conflict.  But if seemings 
just are beliefs, we would have to uncharitably say that, while deliberating, you irrationally believe 
both p and not-p. 
 
We also think, against some accounts (Tolhurst 1998; Huemer 2001: 58-79), that seemings must 
be distinguished from sensations.  Typically, when we have sensations they are accompanied by 
seemings.  For instance, when I bite into an apple it might taste tart and, simultaneously, seem to 
me that it is tart.  But the sensation and the seeming are distinct.  An infant might have the very 
                                                          
8 Notice that it could seem to you that there is a tree without you actually forming the belief that there is a tree.  For 
this reason, PC is a principle of propositional justification rather than doxastic justification.  That is, you have 
justification for believing p regardless of whether you in fact come to believe p. 
9 In fact, one formulation of such a principle we like avoids potentially confusing justification language altogether:  
“(Reasons Commonsensism):  If it seems to S that p, then S thereby has a pro tanto reason for believing p” (Dougherty 
2011: 333). 
10 See McAllister 2018a for a more complete presentation of the reasons to resist reduction. 
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same sensations that an adult would have while looking at a picture above her crib, but it won’t 
seem to her that there is a van Gogh print on the wall (as it would to an adult).  Importantly, as we 
gain new concepts and background beliefs, we begin to experience the world in deeper ways.  
There is a sense in which art experts see more when viewing paintings.  The expert has “thicker” 
experiences in which things seem to him to be the case that would never occur to the novice. 
 
Seemings, then, are assertive experiences with propositional content.11  On reflection, we think it 
apparent that most (really all) of our beliefs are based on the way things seem, at least somewhere 
down the line.  What PC claims is that seemings can serve as the ultimate source of justification 
for those beliefs. 
 
Consider now the notion of justification.  Epistemic justification is an evaluative notion; that is, it 
involves an assessment or evaluation of our beliefs.  There are two major schools of thought on 
justification: internalism and externalism.  Roughly, internalists hold that epistemic justification 
rests on features the subject is or can be aware of.  They evaluate whether your belief is fitting or 
sensible or permissible given the information available to you.12  Externalists hold that justification 
largely depends on features of which the subject may be unaware, such as whether the belief is 
formed by an objectively reliable process or by properly functioning mental faculties.13   
 
Say you were briefly abducted by aliens, who then wiped your memories and replaced them with 
false memories of a quiet evening at home.  As a result, you believe that you spent yesterday 
evening reading a book by the fire.  Given internalism, this belief is justified, since it best fits the 
information within your first-person perspective.  Given externalism, this belief is likely 
unjustified, since it is unreliably formed and improperly caused.   
 
PC is a thesis about internalist justification.  It says that when something seems true to you, and 
you have no reason to think that this experience is misleading, then, from your perspective, it is 
sensible for you to believe it.  Even if your experience is misleading, this does not affect the internal 
justification of your belief so long as this fact remains unknown to you.   
 
It is also important to understand that PC is an internalist view of justification rather than a view 
of knowledge.  Internalists (like ourselves) think internalist justification is necessary but 
insufficient for knowledge.  Advocates of PC might even include accounts of virtue, reliability, 
and/or proper function in their account of knowledge.  But we think this focus on justification is 
crucial.  While we can’t control the nature of the external world (e.g., whether we live in 
Descartes’s demon world), and hence we can’t fully control whether we have knowledge, we can 
all do our level best to believe according to our evidence. 
 
                                                          
11 Cullison 2010 thinks of seemings as sui generis “propositional attitudes.”  We prefer to talk of “experiences” 
because we do not want to give the impression that seemings are judgments, choices, or things we endorse.  Seemings 
tend to be much more passive than this. 
12 One should not assume with Plantinga 1993: 15 that internalist epistemic justification is deontological (involving 
praise and blame).  Leading proponents of internalism like Conee and Feldman 2004: 61-64 deny that the view of 
justification they have in mind is deontic. 
13 The most important externalist critique of internalism in recent years is Michael Bergmann’s 2006 dilemma for 
internalism.  For a recent reply from a PC perspective, see Gage 2016. 
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Having clarified the nature of internalist justification, PC can seem almost obvious.  If something 
seems true and we genuinely have zero reason to doubt it, why should we be rationally prohibited 
from believing it—especially if we hold that belief provisionally and are open to correction?  All 
that matters for internalist justification is whether, from the first-person perspective, it makes sense 
to believe something when it seems true and one has no reason to doubt it.  In such conditions, we 
think belief is justified.  After all, what else are we supposed to believe but what seems true from 
our perspective?14   
 
Consider the alternative.  If we cannot base belief on anything that seems true until we have first 
proven that seeming to be reliable, then we will quickly find ourselves mired in skepticism.  Any 
argument you could give for the reliability of one seeming would inevitably rely on other 
seemings; but you would need to give arguments for the reliability of those seemings, which would 
rely on further seemings, and so on.  So, we must give the benefit of the doubt to at least some 
seemings. 
 
Classical Evidentialists might suggest that we initially trust only those seemings whose content is 
incorrigible, or unmistakable in some way; all others must be proven reliable before we base beliefs 
on them.  This would mean that only a few rational and introspective judgments could be properly 
basic.  Alas, this too, we think, would result in pervasive skepticism about matters of common 
sense, both in principle and in fact.  It would lead to skepticism in principle because, as we learned 
from the early Moderns, there doesn’t seem to be any good argument for things like the existence 
of the external world, the existence of other minds, the reality of the past, etc., based solely on 
incorrigible judgments—at least, no such argument is good enough to justify the supreme level of 
confidence we place in those common-sense beliefs.   
 
The Classical Evidentialist approach would also lead to skepticism in fact because, even if there 
is a good argument from incorrigible propositions for, say, the existence of the external world, 
ordinary people do not actually base their beliefs on this sort of argument.  It just seems that there 
is an external world and people believe it.  Indeed, many adults (not to mention toddlers) may not 
be able to even understand the argument much less work it out for themselves.  So, unless we are 
willing to embrace pervasive skepticism about matters of common sense, we must extend the 
benefit of the doubt to a wider variety of seemings.  For instance, we must allow the perceptual 
seeming that there is an external world to immediately justify belief. 
 
Putting aside the threat of skepticism, it seems arbitrary to give the benefit of the doubt some 
seemings but not others, as Classical Evidentialism recommends.  For instance, why would it be 
rational to trust introspective seemings without verifying their reliability but not other kinds of 
seemings?  Introspective seemings may be incorrigible, but we do not know this to be true about 
introspective seemings until we have reflected on those experiences and intuited or argued for their 
incorrigibility; and, for the reasons described above, we cannot require this sort of reflective 
process prior to placing trust in those seemings on pain of total skepticism.  So, any confirmation 
of the reliability of introspective seemings only comes after we have already placed our trust in 
them.   
 
                                                          
14 See Huemer 2001: 104-105 and McGrath 2013: 226 for similar arguments.  Perhaps the most extended articulation 
of this general line of thinking is in McAllister 2019. 
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The fact of the matter is that we initially trust in the testimony of our introspective seemings for 
no other reason than that their content feels true to us.  But all seemings have this same assertive 
phenomenal character, though often to a lesser degree.  If that assertive character is sufficient to 
justify belief, absent defeaters, in the case of introspective seemings, then it should be sufficient 
to justify belief, absent defeaters, in the case of other seemings (albeit to a lesser degree).  In a 
nutshell, if it is rational to believe in the content of some seemings just because that content feels 
true—something that must be the case if we are to rationally believe anything—then it should be 
rational to believe in the content of any seeming whose content similarly feels true.  Thus, 
consistency demands that we trust all seemings to a degree proportional to the strength of their 
assertive phenomenal character.  And this is just what PC maintains. 
 
Common Objections to Phenomenal Conservatism 
 
PC, however, faces two obvious challenges.  First, isn’t PC too permissive?  That is, doesn’t PC 
allow all beliefs to be justified—even crazy beliefs—so long as they seem true to the subject?  
Well, PC is undoubtedly more permissive than some theories of justification.  It allows a wide 
variety of beliefs to be non-inferentially justified.  But why think that justification is difficult to 
obtain?  Outright irrationality is surely less common than partisan talking heads claim.  Indeed, we 
think it an advantage that, on PC, two equally intelligent and thoughtful individuals might 
rationally disagree about an issue.  Sometimes perfectly reasonable disagreements arise because 
(given differences in genetics, environment, past experiences, current beliefs, and a host of other 
factors) people experience the world in different ways.  An adequate theory of justification should, 
like PC, acknowledge this fact. 
 
But couldn’t belief in a flat Earth be justified by PC so long as Earth seems flat to the believer?  
Well, yes and no.  If it were truly the case that the world seemed flat to some tribesman in the 
middle of nowhere—a person with no contact with modern science and who is focused on 
gathering food to survive each day—then, sure, perhaps that tribesman could have a justified false 
belief in a flat Earth.  Why should we expect him to hold beliefs from our perspective rather than 
his own?  Similarly, only the hardest of the hard-hearted would judge a child’s belief in Santa 
Claus epistemically unjustified when every adult she trusts tells her that Santa brings gifts on 
Christmas Eve.  Her justification, we insist, depends on the information she possesses. 
 
However, it would be very difficult for someone in our society to justifiably believe in a flat Earth, 
since they are extremely likely to be aware of defeaters for that view (e.g., pictures from outer 
space, scientists’ testimony, etc.).  Far from troubling PC, this objection highlights the fact that PC 
rightly acknowledges the perspectival nature of rationality.  What we are rational in believing isn’t 
some fixed set of beliefs but depends on the information we possess at a given time.  PC gets 
exactly the right answer, then:  we’d be unjustified, but the tribesman might be justified, in 
believing in a flat Earth.   
 
A second objection arises from the growing awareness that our perceptions of reality can be 
heavily influenced by non-rational factors.  How can PC claim that beliefs based on seemings are 
innocent until proven guilty if seemings can stem from wishful thinking, confirmation bias, or 
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eating spicy peppers?  The worry is that our seemings can be “tainted” by these non-rational factors 
and rendered incapable of justifying belief.  This is known as the cognitive penetration objection.15 
 
While it may appear strong at first, we think this objection is ultimately mistaken.  As we’ve 
already indicated, given the perspectival nature of rationality, what matters for justification is the 
evidence one possesses—not evidence from a third-person perspective.  So long as S is not aware 
that the reason it seems to him that p is because of wishful thinking, then this has no bearing on 
S’s justification for believing p.  But if S knows that the reason it seems to him that p is wishful 
thinking, then S has a defeater and is not justified in believing that p.16  To turn the question around:  
if it strongly seems to S that p, and S is unaware of the tainted source of this seeming, then wouldn’t 
it be irrational for S to flout his experience and fail to believe p? 
 
Far from revealing flaws, then, these objections showcase how PC gives just the right answers vis-
à-vis permissiveness and cognitive penetration. 
 
Theism & Non-Inferential Justification 
 
We argue that PC shows that many theistic beliefs are likely justified.  (Christian belief specifically 
will be the focus of a later section.)  The story here will sound very much like the one Reformed 
Epistemologists typically tell.  There are numerous people to whom it seems God exists when they 
are out in nature, when they pray, in their moments of joy and sorrow.17  Indeed, it is not uncommon 
for believers to undergo periods of time in which God’s existence appears woven into the very 
fabric of existence—they see his fingerprints everywhere.  In these moments, God’s existence can 
seem nearly as apparent as the existence of other human beings.  The very idea of a world without 
God feels absurd.  In accordance with PC, these theistic seemings provide non-inferential 
justification for believing that God exists.18  Defeaters (discussed more in the next section) can 
arise which remove this justification.  But until they do, such believers appear well within their 
epistemic rights to believe that God exists, even if they are mistaken.19  What else are they 
supposed to believe in light of their experiences? 
 
Of course, not everyone finds God’s existence so apparent.  Some have tried to turn this into an 
objection to theism, called “the problem of divine hiddenness,” arguing that there wouldn’t be any 
reasonable doubt about God’s existence if theism were true.  There are convincing objections to 
this line of reasoning that are independent of (but also available to) PC.  For example, at most we 
have evidence for the temporary hiddenness of God, and there are plenty of ways that temporary 
periods of non-belief might prepare people to submit to God or help them grow in his likeness.  
But PC may offer some special insight here.  Given PC, it is natural to think that what is reasonable 
for someone to believe is largely (if not entirely) a function of what seems true to him; but what 
                                                          
15 It has also been referred to as the “tainted source” or “bad basis” objection (Tucker 2013: 12-16). 
16 We should always be watchful for and responsive to indications that our experiences have been skewed by such 
non-rational factors.  By no means does PC say we should dogmatically cling to our beliefs. 
17 If we’re being precise, it more often seems to people that God loves them or that he has forgiven him of their sins—
things which obviously entail God’s existence. 
18 It is also possible, of course, to have strong seemings that God does not exist and thus to be epistemically justified 
in holding atheistic beliefs.  See Dougherty manuscript. 
19 This is a point of contrast with most versions of Reformed Epistemology, which pin the justification of basic theistic 
beliefs on the reliability and design of the faculty producing them and, so in turn, on the existence of God. 
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seems to be the case can be influenced significantly by both communal and individual resistance 
to God.20  Such resistance might prevent God’s existence from being apparent, or even make God 
seem silly or absurd.21  In this case, the non-believer is reasonable—his non-belief is in accordance 
with what seems true to him—and yet things only seem thusly because of human sin.  In those 
cases, the obstacle to reasonable belief would be located in human freedom, not in God. 
 
There are many non-believers today.  Still, the number of people with theistic seemings across 
times, places, and cultures is striking.  Why does it seem to so many people that God exists?22  
Notice first that the experiences which produce theistic seemings tend to have a rational structure.  
It isn’t as though theistic seemings are produced whenever one sees yard kitsch or has indigestion.  
Rather, theistic seemings tend to be produced by experiences that, on some level, objectively 
appear to support God’s existence.  For instance, it may seem to one that God exists when he 
observes exquisite design or gratuitous beauty in nature, or when he thinks about why anything at 
all exists (even if he doesn’t know terms like ‘contingency’).  It makes sense to posit, then, that 
(many) theistic seemings result when the subject tacitly grasps the ways in which features of the 
world support God’s existence (McAllister and Dougherty 2018). 
 
Studies by cognitive and developmental psychologists appear to show that we are built to notice 
signs of agency, and so will automatically come to believe in God at a very young age (Barrett 
2004).  We seem to be built with mental modules or pathways along which we naturally think.  
These make it easy and natural for us to see the world as designed, as the product of intelligent 
agency rather than mindless forces.  Our natural tendency to draw these sorts of logical connections 
can be thought of as a kind of cognitive mechanism or faculty, sometimes called the “sensus 
divinitatis.”23  While some have sought to argue that our natural tendency toward theism means 
religious belief is a trick of our evolved brains, what the science really shows is that we are built 
for it to seem to us like God exists (Schloss and Murray 2009).  Isn’t this exactly the way God 
would build us if he wanted us to be aware of him and hold justified beliefs about his existence?   
 
Usually, subjects only recognize the support for God on a tacit level.  Cognitive science tells us 
that we are quite adept at this sort of subconscious processing, especially when it comes to 
detecting signs of agency (Barrett 2004).  Thus, the subject is not making any sort of conscious 
inference or argument.  Nevertheless, the logical connections that one intuitively grasps are the 
sorts of things that, if consciously articulated, would construct theistic arguments.  
 
This marks a point of contrast between our view and Plantinga-style Reformed Epistemology.  
Like us, Plantinga posits the existence of a sensus divinitatis, but unlike us, the structure of the 
world is only accidentally involved in triggering the sensus divinitatis.  As Plantinga writes, “the 
experience is the occasion for the formation of the beliefs in question” (Plantinga 2000: 259).  If 
                                                          
20 The role of communal sin is, we think, underplayed in these discussions.  The rejection of truth by a few can easily 
infect the perspectives of the many by becoming a part of the dominant cultural narrative. 
21 An interesting possibility here is that the fallen perspective may fail to appreciate the myriad ways in which God 
best explains the world around us.  Thus, the evidence for God would be available in an objective sense, but one would 
fail to draw the relevant connections between those things and God.  This resembles an idea suggested by Rousselot 
1990. 
22 The story we give here is not entailed by PC.  We think it plausible and fitting, however. 
23 The concept of a sensus divinitatis, in its most general sense, just seems to be that of a general cognitive faculty 
whereby we secure non-inferential justification for belief in God’s existence and basic divine attributes. 
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our experiences only serve as occasions for the formation of theistic belief, and nothing more, then 
there is no in-principle reason why any kind of experience—such as the experience of yawning or 
tying one’s shoes—couldn’t trigger the sensus divinitatis.  In contrast, on our view, the experiences 
of the world that reveal God to us bear an evidential relation to God (à la Romans 1:18-20), not 
merely a causal relation to theistic belief.   
 
Plantinga’s conception of the sensus divinitatis seems to be that of a special religious faculty—a 
mechanism that is designed to produce exclusively theistic beliefs and that wouldn’t exist if God 
didn’t (Plantinga 2000: 187).  Positing a special religious faculty runs contrary to the findings of 
cognitive science of religion, which suggest that belief in God typically results from standard kinds 
of cognitive mechanisms.  Our view, on the other hand, models theistic belief as arising from 
standard cognitive abilities that are independently confirmed through reflection and cognitive 
science.  It thus avoids the appearance of special pleading and harmonizes well with this growing 
body of research. 
 
What is especially exciting is that the phenomenal conservative approach offers us the above 
advantages while retaining what is best about Plantinga-style Reformed Epistemology.  Plantinga 
(2000) was concerned to show how ordinary believers might reasonably hold religious beliefs even 
though they do not know the ins and outs of classical theistic arguments.  Their beliefs could, 
Plantinga argued, have positive epistemic status even without arguments.  We think that this is 
exactly right, and PC successfully captures this fact.24 
 
Often, however, Plantinga went well beyond claiming that theistic beliefs could have positive 
epistemic status without arguments; he implied that theistic beliefs could have positive epistemic 
status even without evidence.  Along with Classical Evidentialism, we think this a mistake.  We 
think a broader and more humane understanding of evidence than that offered by many 
evidentialists is what is missing.  It is not only arguments but experiences that constitute 
evidence.25 
 
In this way, PC gives us the best of both worlds vis-à-vis Reformed Epistemology and Classical 
Evidentialism.  Classical Evidentialism was right to emphasize the role of evidence in epistemic 
justification but wrong to insist that, in the case of theistic belief, this evidence must consist in 
arguments.  Reformed Epistemology was right in its insistence that ordinary theistic beliefs might 
be non-inferentially justified but wrong to detach this justification from evidence.  PC, then, 
incorporates the best of both views and leaves their weaknesses behind.   
 
Theism & Inferential Justification 
 
                                                          
24 Furthermore, PC captures this fact without going overboard in the opposite direction.  Plantingian Reformed 
Epistemology appeared to give arguments little role in the justification of theistic belief.  This is odd.  Surely arguments 
have some significant role to play in the justification of theistic belief.  Our approach allows non-inferentially justified 
theistic belief while still ascribing an important role to arguments in the formation of those beliefs, as well as in their 
long-term justification (see the following section on the latter point). 
25 We think, however, that Plantinga’s project could be modified and ultimately harmonized with our view.  See 
especially Tucker 2011 and McAllister and Dougherty 2018. 
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It is important to see that PC is a principle of prima facie justification.26  It claims that seemings 
justify, all other things being equal.  So even if God’s existence seems apparent, this can’t be the 
end of the story—at least for most ordinary people in our culture—as theists will almost inevitably 
encounter all manner of potential defeaters.  You don’t have to be an academic to wonder how a 
good God could allow children to suffer, whether theism can be reconciled with contemporary 
science, etc.  Such challenges, if left unanswered, can be enough to defeat the non-inferential 
justification provided by one’s theistic seemings.  Thus, mature theists will likely need to address 
such questions in order to achieve secure, sustainable justification for their beliefs.27 
 
Now, the defeaters one encounters are not always that sophisticated, and hence one’s defeater-
defeaters don’t always need to be that sophisticated either.  We shouldn’t pretend that everyone is 
(or should be) an academic.  But neither should we naively think that a one-off seeming that God 
exists can and should carry one’s theistic belief fully justified throughout adulthood.  The mature 
theist will likely need to build up a coherent and mutually supporting system of beliefs around her 
theism in order to remain justified. 
 
Building up a worldview is something we rational creatures do naturally.  We wonder at the world, 
and this leads us to gather evidence about its various features.  Since God’s existence bears on 
nearly everything, the theist will frequently need to assess how this evidence fits with theism.  This 
process typically plays out over a considerable period of time, moving in fits and spurts.  How 
exactly this process unfolds and what comes of it will depend greatly on the specific individual.  
 
On the micro-level, the theist will focus in on specific items of evidence (other things that seem 
true) and evaluate how well theism explains that evidence.  We suspect that the ordinary theist will 
find numerous instances in which her observations are explained especially well by theism.  
Perhaps the theist has witnessed a remarkable transformation in her own life and in the lives of 
others that is hard to make sense of apart from God.  Perhaps the theist feels in herself a deep 
yearning for something beyond this world and judges this yearning best explained by God.  Or, if 
she is more philosophically minded, she might find that her belief in objective morality fits better 
with theism than with naturalism, or that theism better explains the existence of contingent beings.  
In such instances, the individual gains inferential support for her theistic belief.   
 
One source of inferential justification worth emphasizing is testimony.  Testimony provides 
inferential support for its content if one has evidence for the reliability of the testifier—be it a 
person, organization, or sacred text.28  Obviously, this evidence of reliability can take the form of 
arguments, but, given PC, it needn’t.  As Dougherty (2014) argues, an appearance of credibility in 
the testifier is enough to provide support for the content of that testimony.  Thus, if one hears 
testimony of God’s existence (from one’s parents, the Church, the Bible, etc.), and the source 
seems credible, then one will have additional support for theism, absent defeaters.   
 
                                                          
26 We actually prefer the phrase pro tanto, because prima facie might lead one to think that when a defeater arises the 
initial belief was never justified in the first place.  In reality, as the pro tanto language indicates, a defeater that arises 
later in time doesn’t show one’s initial belief never to have been justified but only outweighed at that later time. 
27 Reformed epistemologists are starting to acknowledge this as well.  See Moon forthcoming. 
28 Given PC, there is a sense in which testimony can operate non-inferentially—by occasioning in the recipient a 
seeming in the content of the testimony—but we will leave that aside here. 
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There may also be times when theism seems to fit poorly with other things that seem true.  These 
are potential defeaters.  In these moments, the theist must assess, first, whether there is any genuine 
discord between theism and what seems true, and, if there is, whether it is more reasonable to live 
with the poor fit, alter beliefs in those areas of discord, or abandon theism.  In any case, the support 
for theism is diminished to some degree. 
 
These small-scale evaluations aid the subject in making a single large-scale evaluation of which 
worldview, or system of beliefs, best makes sense of her experiences on the whole.  We seem to 
be built to make exactly these sorts of macro-level judgments about where the weight of probability 
lies (Newman 1979 [1870]).  Making these sorts of evaluations needn’t be an overly formal (or 
fully conscious) process.  As we noted earlier with regard to the origins of theistic seemings, we 
are quite adept at drawing logical connections on a tacit level.  What the subject will experience is 
the impression that the theistic belief system, and the picture of the world that it represents, just 
makes sense. 
 
Thus, if all goes well for theism (which is not guaranteed), the mature theist will be left with a 
coherent system of beliefs centered around her theism which, overall, seems to make better sense 
of reality than the relevant alternatives.  As a result, her theism will no longer be justified solely 
by her initial theistic seeming.  Her theistic belief will also receive a measure of inferential support 
by virtue of its presence in this explanatorily virtuous belief system. 
 
The theism of mature believers, then, will likely enjoy both inferential and non-inferential support.  
This inferential support is, in many cases, subsequent and complementary to one’s non-inferential 
justification.  Hence, one can start from a position of non-inferential justification and then secure 
or bolster one’s justified beliefs with further inferential support.  In the end, theistic belief may be 
justified before the possession of inferential support but typically not without it. 
 
The typical adult theist is thus armed not merely with a bare theistic seeming but with a larger 
worldview in which God is deeply entrenched.  This makes the robust nature of most theistic 
beliefs—even in the face of counterargument—intelligible.  At times atheists have written as 
though ordinary theists are unjustified if they don’t have a sophisticated response to some atheistic 
argument.  But we think this a mistake given the way that our belief networks hang together in a 
complicated fashion.  Many mature theists, we believe, are justified not by a killer argument but 
by the interlocking belief network they’ve built up. 
 
What about intelligent, informed people who come to a different conclusion?  Should the existence 
of such individuals make theists abandon their worldview?  We don’t think so.  The issue is too 
complicated to fully flesh out here, but we will note a few things.  First, for a host of reasons, 
people experience the world in different ways.  No two perspectives are exactly alike.  Thus, PC 
leads us to expect reasonable disagreement on complicated issues like the existence of God.  
Endorsing theism commits you to thinking that atheists are mistaken, but it doesn’t require you to 
think that they are stupid or irrational.  Perhaps they just have different experiences.  Second, a 
fully worked out theistic belief system (especially a Christian one) will usually contain some 
explanation for why people have misleading experiences.  As we said earlier, communal or 
personal resistance to God might distort one’s perspective on the world.  Lastly, even if there is no 
forthcoming explanation for why some people see the world differently, it is not clear that one 
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should therefore withhold trust from one’s own perspective.  Take some horrifying account of 
child abuse from the news.  It seems obvious that those who perpetrate such abuse have done 
something objectively wrong, and yet there are intelligent people who genuinely disagree.  It seems 
to them that what is occurring is distasteful to Western sentiments—highly unfashionable in 
present society—but not objectively wrong.  Even if we were at a loss as to why their perspective 
is distorted, it appears reasonable for us continue to endorse what seems supremely evident to us:  
that such abuse is objectively wrong.29  Rationality does not demand that we automatically 
abandon the obvious just because others, for unknown reasons, cannot see it.  Peer disagreement 
should give us pause, but it does not force one to relinquish theistic belief.30 
 
Beyond Theism to Christian Faith 
 
Much of what we have said about theism will apply with minimal changes to Christian belief.  If 
Christian doctrine seems true (either of its own accord or because of the special work of the Holy 
Spirit), then, given PC, one will possess non-inferential justification for believing it, absent 
defeaters.  Of course, the Christian will also need to go through a worldview-building process 
similar to the theist, and (assuming all goes well for Christianity) thereby supplement his belief 
with inferential support. 
 
On our version of the phenomenal conservative approach, whether a religious belief is justified 
ultimately comes down to whether it is, on balance, supported by what seems true.  The two-fold 
process we’ve described thus far bears this out:  first, look at whether the religious proposition 
itself seems true (and to what extent), and, second, look at how it fits with other things that seem 
true.  But what seems true to an individual is not a static thing.  One’s perspective can change quite 
radically over time.  What seemed apparent at one stage can seem ridiculous at another, and vice 
versa.   
 
Now, a deep commitment to theism or Christianity can’t help but affect the way one views the 
world.  After taking a course in psychology, for instance, you may begin to view ordinary 
interactions through the lens of various psychological theories—identifying confirmation of these 
theories in ways that would otherwise have gone unnoticed.  Just so, the believer may find 
newfound appreciation for the ways in which Christian revelation makes sense of things.  More 
generally, the believer will begin to experience the world in light of her religious framework.  Some 
people watch a nature documentary and say, “Nature’s powers are more amazing than I thought!”  
But the Christian might instead perceive God’s handiwork.  Some see tragedy and decry the 
world’s indifference.  But the believer might see an opportunity to be God’s hands and feet and 
help those in need.  This perspective-shift can be pervasive, systematically reorienting how one 
sees the world. 
 
Though confirmation bias is always a worry, there’s nothing inherently irrational about a belief 
influencing one’s perspective in the way we’ve described.  Your perceptual seemings, for instance, 
are completely saturated by belief in the external world.  When you look around you, it doesn’t 
seem that there are certain arrangements of color sensations, but rather that there are objects—
books, furniture, buildings—existing within a mind-independent world.  A primary purpose of 
                                                          
29 See the example and discussion in Plantinga 1996: 181-182. 
30 For a recent treatment of how PC might handle cases of peer disagreement, see Gage 2014a. 
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education is to help us see the world in light of new concepts.  That said, it is important to reflect 
critically on our experiences, questioning whether our newfound perspective is accurate.  If such 
reflection only confirms the reliability of one’s perspective, then what else is one to do but continue 
to trust it? 
 
The ability to see God in the world can seemingly be honed through prayer and practice, aided by 
grace (Eph. 1:15-19).  In the Christian tradition, believers are told to pray unceasingly (1 Thess. 
5:17), to have the mind of Christ (Phil. 2:5), to reason out of spiritual maturity (1 Cor. 13:11), and 
to be transformed by this renewal of their minds (Rom. 12:2).  That is, Christians are told to think 
like God in all they do—to view the world the way He does—and let this transform their lives.  If 
Christianity is true, there is a kind of intellectual virtue involved here—a habit of thinking in line 
with the truth, conforming our minds to reality, of seeing the world as it actually is with respect to 
God.  Possessing this disposition seems like part of what it is to have Christian faith (McAllister 
2018b). 
 
If faith involves this sort of shift in perspective, then faith has the potential to bolster the 
justification for one’s religious beliefs.  Remember that, on our approach, justification depends on 
whether the position itself seems true and whether it fits with whatever else seems true.  By helping 
one see the world in light of Christian truth-claims, faith increases one’s justification for holding 
these positions.31  This adds a new layer of meaning to C. S. Lewis’s (1996: 106) profession, “I 
believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by 
it I see everything else.” 
 
This way of thinking about faith is quite different from the popular misconception of faith, 
described by Mark Twain as “believing what you know ain’t so.”  Based on something like this 
misconception, Huemer, the father of phenomenal conservatism, thinks of religious beliefs as 
being at odds with the justification conferred via PC.  Huemer (2001: 109-110) is worried about a 
blind leap of faith in which it seems to S that not-p, but because of the teaching of some religious 
authority (the Scriptures or the Magisterium) S believes p.   
 
We agree that believing against what seems true is a great way to have unjustified beliefs.  
However, Huemer fails to understand the perspective of the typical believer.  Because of her faith 
in the religious authority, which the believer normally has reason to trust, there is typically no 
conflict between the believer’s seemings and the religious teaching.  The teaching (like all 
education) affects the very way she sees the world.  For instance, when she prays or worships, it 
is not usually the case that it seems to her that God is absent and then she must will to believe that 
he is present.  Rather, the spiritually minded person just sees God as present in the first place.32  
 
                                                          
31 For more on the epistemic implications of faith, see McAllister 2018b. 
32 Huemer 2001: 109 considers the case in which a Catholic (or other high-church member) receives the Eucharist.  
Huemer appears to think that the believer has the seeming that the consecrated host is bread but believes against this 
seeming because of religious teaching.  Huemer appears to be confusing the two senses of ‘seems’ distinguished by 
Chisholm (above).  The faithful Catholic sees the host as the body of Christ made present.  (N.B., Huemer may also 
be confused about Catholic teaching.  There cannot be a conflict between the way the host looks and the fact that it 
seems to the believer to be the body of Christ since the Catholic Church teaches that the accidents (all the looks) of 
the bread remain post-transubstantiation.) 
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We have been focusing on the intellectual dimensions of faith thus far, but one must remember 
that Christian faith goes beyond seemings and beliefs—after all, even the demons believe (James 
2:19).33  Faith, as we understand it, involves a disposition (by grace) to trust and commit one’s 
entire self to God.  It is typically a commitment in the direction of one’s theistic evidence and is 
thus in concert with reason; grace building on nature.  But it is a comprehensive commitment—
not only epistemic but also affective and volitional.  As in a marriage, it is a commitment of the 
entire person to the beloved, holding nothing back; it is a total self-gift (Wojtyla 1993 [1960]).  
This comes with a commitment to action:  to deepen one’s relationship with God, to live life in 
light of this commitment to God.   
 
People with such intimate faith can find it difficult to talk about “evidence” for God.  That language 
can feel cold and reductionistic.  They think they see God and experience him every day.  If we 
started talking to you about the evidence for your best friend’s existence, you might see it as beside 
the point (cf. Austin 1962: 115).  This is how many people of faith feel.  They know the person of 
Christ, and so talk of evidence can seem inappropriate.  Their confidence is so strong, their 
experience so overwhelming, that academic arguments and evidence seem irrelevant. 
 
As we have sought to show, however, they have evidence nonetheless:  the non-inferential 
evidence of the way things seem to them as well as their (likely) inferential evidence in the way of 
a large-scale explanatory judgment that God’s existence makes the most sense of the totality of 
their experience.  Evidence in this sense is a natural companion to the kind of personal knowledge 
of God that the person of faith enjoys.  Therefore, seeking evidence for God and seeking 
relationship with him are not only compatible but mutually reinforcing.  This has been so not only 
in our academic work but also in our personal lives. 
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